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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
wealthy may avoid having their deaths bring about the enrichment
of several coffers will be to confine their activities to one state.
H. A. W., JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAv -

FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

STATUTE

RIGHT OF STATE TO REVOKE AUTOMOBILE OPERATOR'S LICENSE

FOR NONPAYME NT OF JUDGMENT RENDERED IN ANOTHER STATE.

-

A judgment for damages was taken against the plaintiff in New
York resulting from his operation of an automobile in that state.
Under the West Virginia financial responsibility statute" the plaintiff's license to operate a motor vehicle in West Virginia was suspended by the State Road Commissioner for his failure for thirty
days to satisfy this judgment. The plaintiff sued to have the order
of suspension set aside, claiming that the statute was fathered by
insurance companies, is discriminative, denies the plaintiff due
process of law, and is accordingly unconstitutional. Held, that the
statute is a valid exercise of the state police power and is therefore
2
constitutional. Nulter v. State Road Commission of West Virginia.
One judge dissented on the theory that the statute constituted
an unreasonable extension of a state's police power beyond its territorial limits." However, in basing the suspension of the license
on a liability incurred in New York, West Virginia did not extend
the police power of the former into this state,4 but merely determined by a reasonable exercise of its own police power that, because of the plaintiff's conduct and financial irresponsibility as
illustrated by the unsatisfied New York judgment, he was unqualified to operate a motor vehicle in West Virginia.'
IW. Va. Acts 1935, c. 61, § 3: "In the event of the failure of any person,
within thirty days thereafter, to satisfy any judgment, vhich -hall have become final ... in this state or in any other state or the District of Columbia,
or in any district court of the United States, or by a court of competent jurisdiction in . . . the Dominion of Canada, for damages . . . in excess of fifty
dollars, resulting from the ownership, maintenance, use or operation hereafter of a motor vehicle, the learner's permit, operator's and/or chauffeur's
license, every certificate of registration and the registration plates of such
person shall be forthwith suspended by the commissioner . ..
2193 S. E. 549 (W. Va. 1937).
3Nulter v. State Road Comm., dissenting opinion, 194 S. E. 270 (W. Va.
1937).
4 The theory of the dissent seems to be that this was an extension of New
York police power into West Virginia. On the same principle it may be
argued that West Virginia police power was extended into New York.
G e Probasco, 269 Mfich. 453, 257 IT. W. 861 (1934). Revocation of an
operator's license for a conviction for drunken driving was not a penalty or
punishment, but the conviction showed the unfitness of the offender to operate
an automobile on the public highways.
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
There have been numerous recent cases declaring valid financial responsibility statutes similar to the one in question except that
they do not expressly include judgments from other states. The
California case cited in the opinion states that the operation of
motor vehicles is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the
interest of public safety and welfare. 7 The New Jersey court
holds that the financial responsibility law imposes a penalty for
negligent driving, and the resulting penalty for failure to pay a
judgment is merely incidental.8 A Pennsylvania decision makes
the flat statement that the enforcement of these regulations by
revocation or suspension of the privilege of operating an automobile is not the taking of property without due process of law,'
and this holding is adhered to in other jurisdictions. 10
The general rule appears to be that a license to operate an
automobile is a bare privilege." There is, however, a Virginia decision which argues to the contrary.' 2 There the court stated that
the use of the public highways, including the operation of an
automobile thereon, is a common right which one has under his
right to life, liberty, and property, and it is not a mere privilege.
Regarding the theory of plenary regulation of automobile operation the court said that this doctrine has been pronounced most
often in cases involving licenses or permits to sell intoxicating
liquors, or to do other things which because of their character are,
or tend to be injurious, but that it has no application to permits
issued for the purpose of regulating the use of private automobiles
in the usual and ordinary way."
In a recent decision the Idaho supreme court considered the
a Watson v. State Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481
(1931).
See also Sheehan v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 140 Cal. App. 200, 35 P.
(2d) 359 (1934).
s Garford Trucking, Inc. v. Hoffman, 114 N. J. L. 522, 177 AtI. 882 (1935).
9 Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936).
10 State v. Price, 63 P. (2d) 653, 108 A. L. R. 1156 (Ariz. 1937); Munz v,
Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); In re Opinion of the Justices,
251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680 (1925); La Plante v. State Board of Public
Roads, 47 R. . 258, 131 Atl. 641 (1926); People v. Cohen, 128 Misc. 29, 217
N. Y. S. 726 (1926); Note (1937) 108 A. L. R. 1162, 1165.
1"42 C. J. 659, Motor Vehicles § 75; 42 C. J. 722, Motor Vehicles § 182.
12 Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579 (1930), 71 A. L. R. 604
(1931).

13 Bevocation of the operator's license in this case was invalidated finally
not as a denial of property without due process, but on a wrongful delegation
of power basis. Thompson v. Smith has not been followed as to the proposi-
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constitutionality of a statute which authorized the suspension of
an operator's license if the operator had been involved in an acci14
dent resulting in death, injury, or serious property damage.'
This statute was held unconstitutional as authorizing a taking of
property without due process of law, two justices dissenting on the
ground that the operation of an automobile was not a right but a
privilege' 5
There is no decision of the United States Supreme Court in
regard to the constitutionality of these financial responsibility
statutes; nor has that court expressly declared itself upon the question of whether the operation of a motor vehicle is merely a privilege or a liberty or property right, though certain cases are sometimes cited for that proposition.'
It therefore seems probable that in a case where the exercise
by a state of its police power is deemed unreasonable in its highway regulations, the license to operate a motor vehicle may be
given the protection of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
J. H. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

STATE'S RIGHT TO CRIMINAL APPEAL.

Palko was tried for first degree murder, and found guilty of
second degree murder. Thereafter the state of Connecticut appealed, with the permission of the trial judge under a state statute'
and the case was reversed. On the second trial the defendant Palko
was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death."
He objected to the second trial on the ground that it placed him
twice in jeopardy for the same offense, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and
appealed to the Supreme Court on the same ground. Held, that
the execution of the sentence would not deprive Palko of life with-

tion that the operation of an automobile is a right, and it has been cited fox
that proposition only in the dissent in Be Probasco, 269 Mich. 453, 257 N. W.
861 (1934).
14 State v. Kouni, 76 P. (2d) 917 (Idaho 1938).
15 Chicago v. Banker, 112 fll. App. 94 (1904).
16 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S.352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927);

Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1915);
Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S.535, 24 L. Ed. 148 (1876).
1CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6494. See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 297
U. S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674, 90 A. L. R. 575 (1936), on the state's
right to regulate criminal procedure.
2 State v. Palko, 121 Conn. 660, 186 Atl. 657 (1936); Palko v. State, 122
Conn. 529, 191 At. 320 (1937).
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